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TECH ACCOUNTABILITY IN FACE OF GENOCIDE:
GAMBIA V. FACEBOOK
ABSTRACT
The exigent nature of genocide, inherent costs of litigation that may impede
ongoing investigations, and general reluctance of tech companies toward
international data disclosure underscore the need for states and
intergovernmental organizations to enforce more expedient discovery
procedures for cases involving crimes against humanity. The discovery case
between the Gambia and Facebook illustrates how the current legal framework
regulating international data disclosures is ill-equipped to nimbly address the
exigence of genocide in Myanmar.
Existing bilateral agreements and multilateral treaties overseeing
international data disclosure should be amended to compel third-party internet
service providers to disclose information in the extreme and exigent case of
genocide. Without further changes, efforts to compel third parties will continue
to fail. Investigating bodies will continue to depend on narrow exceptions when
disclosure aligns with the business interests of internet service providers.
Cases investigating genocide will persist in purgatory. Lives will remain
hanging in the balance.
This Comment will focus on the discovery case between the Gambia and
Facebook and its collateral effects on the ongoing investigation into the
Rohingya genocide in Myanmar. In doing so, this Comment will analyze how
American tech giants like Facebook conduct extensive business outside the
United States and circumvent foreign regulation and government intervention
to the detriment of local communities.
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INTRODUCTION
Against the backdrop of an unrelenting global pandemic, the world has
experienced social and economic upheavals unprecedented in recent memory.1
During the first few months leading up to the initial wave of lockdowns around
the world, hospitals buckled and political leaders balked as the rates of infections
and mortalities swelled beyond control. In the United States, communities of
color have been disproportionately afflicted and underserved in nearly all
COVID-19 hotspots.2 Meanwhile, the killing of George Floyd in the spring of
2020 unleashed a torrent of repressed anger and anguish over the country’s
lingering legacy of racial injustice.3 In the wake of such tragedies, Americans
have collectively reached a tipping point in grappling with systemic racism and
political instability unseen since the Civil Rights Movement.4
At the same time, the future of global democracy remains bleak as the world
emerges from 2020 on “the brink of a catastrophic moral failure.”5 As the richest
countries in the developed world race to inoculate their citizens ahead of their
poorer neighbors across the developing world,6 public participation in
democratic governments and protection of civil liberties continue to decline as
the world remains in perpetual lockdown.7 Before the first week of 2021
concluded, American insurrectionists brazenly sieged the nation’s capital and

1
Editorial, Here Comes the Coronavirus Pandemic: Now, After Many Fire Drills, the World May Be
Facing a Real Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/29/opinion/sunday/coronavirus-usa.html.
2
See Jazmyn T. Moore et al., Disparities in Incidence of COVID-19 Among Underrepresented
Racial/Ethnic Groups in Counties Identified as Hotspots During June 5-18, 2020 – 22 States, February-June
2020, CDC (Aug. 21, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6933e1.htm (reporting disproportionate
number of infections in underrepresented ethnic/racial groups in almost all hotspots from February to June 2020).
3
Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement
in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floydprotests-crowd-size.html.
4
Id.
5
Vaccine Nationalism Means that Poor Countries Will Be Left Behind, ECONOMIST (Jan. 28, 2021),
https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2021/01/28/vaccine-nationalism-means-that-poor-countries-willbe-left-behind.
6
Id.
7
Global Democracy Has a Very Bad Year, ECONOMIST (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.economist.com/
graphic-detail/2021/02/02/global-democracy-has-a-very-bad-year.

KIM_4.25.22

168

4/25/2022 5:33 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

threatened the future of the most powerful democracy in the world.8 Drawing
stunning similarities to the storming of the U.S. Capitol Complex, the Myanmar
military refused to accept its country’s own November election results and
staged a coup in February 2021, deploying martial law and detaining
government officials including leader Aung San Suu Kyi.9
These recent events undoubtedly raise grave implications for the ongoing
legal proceedings Myanmar and Facebook face for the atrocities committed
against the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar. In late 2019, the Gambia filed an
application in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) alleging Myanmar had
violated the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Genocide Convention) by committing acts of genocide against the
Rohingya Muslims.10 Both the Gambia and Myanmar are parties to the Genocide
Convention and thus fall under the jurisdiction of the ICJ.11 In the resulting case,
Gambia v. Myanmar, the Gambia seeks to end the genocide, prosecute
government perpetrators in an international penal tribunal such as the
International Criminal Court (ICC), and ensure a safe path for the Rohingya to
return to Myanmar.12
Now that the Myanmar military has regained control, the UN-appointed
Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) is unlikely to
continue its factfinding mission in collecting evidence of genocidal intent
against Rohingya Muslims.13 As such, parties seeking justice, such as the
Gambia, will need alternative sources of evidence to build its case against
Myanmar. Following Facebook’s removal of accounts associated with the
Myanmar military in 2018, the Gambia struggled to receive adequate support
from Facebook, which can disclose account information of Myanmar military
leaders responsible for the Rohingya Genocide.14 As a result, the Gambia issued
8
Dan Barry, Mike McIntire & Matthew Rosenberg, Our President Wants Us Here: The Mob that
Stormed the Capitol, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 09, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/us/capitol-rioters.html.
9
Bill Chappell & Jaclyn Diaz, Myanmar Coup: With Aung San Suu Kyi Detained, Military Takes Over
Government, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 1, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2021/02/01/962758188/myanmar-coup-militarydetains-aung-san-suu-kyi-plans-new-election-in-2022.
10
Priya Pillai, The Gambia v Myanmar at the International Court of Justice: Points of Interest in the
Application, OPINIO JURIS (Nov. 13, 2019), https://opiniojuris.org/2019/11/13/the-gambia-v-myanmar-at-theinternational-court-of-justice-points-of-interest-in-the-application.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Priya Pillai, Myanmar Coup d’État – Implications for International Justice, OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 11,
2020), https://opiniojuris.org/2021/02/11/myanmar-coup-detat-implications-for-international-justice.
14
Priya Pillai, The Republic of The Gambia v. Facebook, Inc.: Domestic Proceedings, International
Implications, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 8, 2020), https://opiniojuris.org/2020/08/08/the-republic-of-the-gambia-vfacebook-inc-domestic-proceedings-international-implications.
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a companion discovery case in 2020, Gambia v. Facebook, to compel the social
media company to disclose relevant evidence for the Gambia’s main case against
Myanmar.15 On September 22, 2021, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia ruled in favor of the Gambia and ordered Facebook to
disclose deleted content requested by the Gambia.16 Whether Facebook will
appeal remains unclear.
Regardless, this discovery case between the Gambia and Facebook reveals
how the current legal framework regulating international data disclosures does
not adequately address exigent cases of genocide. In fact, it underscores the need
for more expedient foreign disclosure methods. Given the ICJ’s unanimous
finding of a “real and imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights invoked
by the Gambia” over the Myanmar military’s acts against the Rohingya people
and other Muslim minorities,17 Facebook should be compelled to disclose
account information of Myanmar military officials under investigation for
genocide and crimes against humanity. The exigent nature of genocide, inherent
costs of litigation that may further impede ongoing investigations, and general
reluctance tech companies have toward international data disclosure underscore
the need for states and intergovernmental organizations to enforce more
expedient discovery procedures for cases involving crimes against humanity.
Specifically, existing bilateral agreements and multilateral treaties overseeing
international data disclosure should be amended to compel third-party internet
service providers to disclose information in the extreme and exigent case of
genocide. Without further changes, efforts to compel third parties will continue
to fail and investigating bodies will depend on the limited instances disclosure
falls within the business interests of internet service providers. As this Comment
will further explore in the specific case of the Rohingya genocide in Myanmar,
American social media companies that operate extensively outside the United
States are often free to circumvent local regulation and government intervention
and instead adopt a free-market approach of maintaining user expectations
according to their own internal corporate policies.
In the event Facebook appeals, the appellate court may still rule in favor of
the Gambia but try to limit disclosure. In particular, Facebook may be compelled
to only provide non-content information for the seventeen identified individuals
listed in the Gambia’s original request, such as registered e-mail addresses,
15

Id.
The Republic of the Gambia v. Facebook, https://www.washingtonpost.com/context/order-in-re-therepublic-of-the-gambia-v-facebook-inc/6fd698bc-034f-43e2-a544-5592e174bc8a/?itid=lk_inline_manual_1.
17
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Gam. v.
Myan.), Order, 2020 I.C.J. No. 178, ¶¶ 71–76 (Jan. 23) [hereinafter ICJ Order].
16

KIM_4.25.22

170

4/25/2022 5:33 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

names, and phone numbers associated with their Facebook, Instagram, and
WhatsApp accounts. In Gambia v. Facebook, Facebook broadly insisted the
Gambia should exhaust alternative methods of collecting user data. However,
the court should dismiss this argument. Under the current regulatory scheme,
foreign countries like the Gambia need to enter into a bilateral agreement with
the United States, known as a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT).18 In the
extreme unlikelihood the Gambia is able to negotiate a bilateral agreement with
the United States and have a gridlocked Congress ratify the treaty within a
reasonable time frame,19 the MLAT process generally takes an additional two
years for American courts and companies to process search warrants seeking
electronic content, such as posts, videos, and pictures.20
This added procedural delay will undoubtedly halt the Gambia’s companion
case against Myanmar unless the Gambia is able to find the requested
information through alternative means. Given the current political instability in
Myanmar, the IIMM is unlikely to collect additional evidence, while human
rights activists face similar obstacles as the Myanmar military resorts to violence
on the streets.21 Effective private-sector workarounds are also unlikely, as tech
companies continue to limit third parties, including investigatory journalists and
war crime watchdogs, from accessing their data.22 Moreover, user data sourced
outside of Facebook by third parties may be scrutinized for its validity and
ultimately still require some form of verification or authenticity from Facebook,
defeating the whole purpose of circumventing the company in the first place.
Separately, Facebook previously promised to work with the U.N. Human
Rights Council (UNHRC) and assist in providing any necessary evidence for its
ongoing investigations. However, such commitments have proven difficult to
fulfill without substantial external pressure from the press. In August 2020, the
head of the IIMM reported Facebook had failed to share evidence highly relevant
and probative of “serious international crimes” despite engaging in talks over

18
Jonah Force Hill, Problematic Alternatives: MLAT Reform for the Digital Age, HARV. NAT’L SEC. J.
(Jan. 28, 2015), https://harvardnsj.org/2015/01/problematic-alternatives-mlat-reform-for-the-digital-age.
19
The process of reaching an MLAT with the United States can range in time from one to eight years, as
demonstrated by Israel and Ireland respectively. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of the Legal Advisor, A List of
Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 2020 1, 216, 228
(2020), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/TIF-2020-Full-website-view.pdf.
20
Id.
21
Myanmar Coup: Woman Shot at Protest Fights for Life, BBC (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-asia-56005909.
22
Catherine Shu, Changes to Facebook Graph Search Leaves Online Investigators in a Lurch, TECH
CRUNCH (June 11, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/06/10/changes-to-facebook-graph-search-leaves-onlineinvestigators-in-a-lurch.
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the past year.23 Within the following month, Facebook partially complied and
shared deleted data associated with the military, despite claiming it had
previously deleted eighteen accounts and fifty-two pages of data associated with
the Myanmar military, including the commander-in-chief.24 The Gambia may
present these findings to the court as evidence for obstruction of justice.
However, until treaties binding both the Gambia and the United States are
amended, the Gambia and future states investigating genocide will continue to
face lengthy challenges when requesting data from technology companies
through non-voluntary means.
In Part I, this Comment will discuss how social media has propelled
unprecedented social change across the world, and how Facebook in particular
has attempted to balance competing interests in user privacy and regulation. Part
I will also provide historical background leading up to the central case, Gambia
v. Facebook, by outlining the timeline of events starting with (1) the deadly
military crackdown in 2017 and resulting refugee crisis in northern Myanmar
and neighboring Bangladesh, before progressing onto (2) the ensuing
international response and U.N. investigations implicating Facebook’s
involvement, and then analyzing (3) the Gambia’s suit against Myanmar for the
Burmese Government’s crimes against the Rohingya minority. Part II will dive
into the actual merits of the case between the Gambia and Facebook by
evaluating how the arguments of each party fare under the existing legal
frameworks of international data disclosure. The Conclusion will assess the
impact of the case, next steps the Gambia will have to take to move forward with
its concurrent case against Myanmar, and the overall implications the case may
have on future discovery measures involving the ICJ and tech companies
domiciled in the United States.

23
Poppy McPherson, U.N. Investigator Says Facebook Has Not Shared ‘Evidence’ of Myanmar Crime,
REUTERS (Aug. 11, 2020) (quoting Nicholas Koumjian, Head of the IIMM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usmyanmar-facebook/u-n-investigator-says-facebook-has-not-shared-evidence-of-myanmar-crime-idUSKCN257
0K9.
24
Poppy McPherson, Facebook Shares Data on Myanmar with United Nations Investigators, REUTERS
(Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-myanmar-facebook/facebook-shares-data-on-myanmarwith-united-nations-investigators-idUKKBN25L2HE?edition-redirect=uk; Ella Glover, Facebook Has Now
Shared Evidence About Myanmar Atrocities With IIMM, PC GUIDE (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.pcguide.com/
news/facebook-has-now-shared-evidence-about-myanmar-atrocities-with-iimm.
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BACKGROUND

A. Tech Accountability in the Globalized Era of Social Media Remains
Unclear
Within the span of a generation, technological advancements have
fundamentally altered the way we communicate with each other in a seemingly
smaller and more interconnected, globalized community. For better or for worse,
communicating on social media platforms has ushered in a new era of sharing
information. Some fear the relative ease of communicating virtually has resulted
in the inevitable “weaponization” of social media.25 Whether instigating
widespread movements for democracy in the Arab Spring revolution26 or
inciting insurrection at the U.S. Capitol,27 social media has proven to be an
astonishingly effective tool in dismantling or upholding authoritarian control,
depending on who wields this double-edged sword.28
On the one hand, democracies around the world rallied in support of the
young revolutionaries behind the Arab Spring movement and marveled at how
hundreds of thousands of young individuals mobilized across the Middle East
and North Africa on Facebook and Twitter to protest their countries’ oppressive
regimes.29 On the other hand, authoritarian regimes have also started to exploit
social media for their own control. After banning Facebook, the Vietnamese
government created its own social media platform to suppress speech and
conduct surveillance on its civilians.30 For the 2016 U.S. presidential elections,
state-endorsed hackers from Russia disseminated misinformation and
conspiracy theories on government misconduct and candidate Hilary Clinton
through sophisticated advertisements and posts on Instagram and Facebook over
the course of at least two years.31

25
Neriah Yue, Note, The “Weaponization” of Facebook in Myanmar: A Case for Corporate Criminal
Liability, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 813, 817–18 (2020).
26
Id.
27
Sheera Frenkel, The Storming of Capitol Hill Was Organized on Social Media, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/06/us/politics/protesters-storm-capitol-hill-building.html; see
Ryan Hal Budish, International Law and the Internet: Adapting Legal Frameworks in Response to Online
Warfare and Revolutions Fueled by Social Media: Click to Change: Optimism Despite Online Activism’s Unmet
Expectations, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 745, 758–59 (2012).
28
Yue, supra note 25.
29
Budish, supra note 27.
30
Id. at 753.
31
Sheera Frenkel & Katie Benner, To Stir Discord in 2016, Russians Turned Most Often to Facebook,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/17/technology/indictment-russian-techfacebook.html.
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In addition to individuals utilizing social media against state regimes and
vice versa, states have begun to mobilize social media against other states to
promote their own interests in data privacy and national security. Within the
final months of 2020, the Trump administration declared its intent to ban viral
video and messaging applications, TikTok and WeChat, from the United States
on the basis that the “Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ha[d] demonstrated the
means and motives to use these apps to threaten the national security, foreign
policy, and the economy of the U.S.”32 The Biden administration subsequently
revoked the Trump administration’s outright ban; however, the Biden
administration will continue monitoring how Chinese apps collect and process
American data.33 As such, regardless of whether the allegations made by the
Trump administration were grounded in substantive intelligence findings, the
underlying concern of how these social media applications “collec[t] vast swaths
of data from users, including network activity, location data, and browsing and
search histories”34 underscores the pervasive and unprecedented reach social
media commands as well as the inherent dangers they can impose.
1. Facebook’s Global Dominance Demands Greater Responsibility than
What is Currently Required
Despite the ubiquitous use of social media around the world, few companies,
if any, rival the original technology titans that started it all. In the first quarter of
2020, Facebook boasted a monthly estimate of 2.85 billion active users and
remains the largest social media company in the world.35 The majority of
Facebook users are outside the United States.36 Nine out of the top twenty
countries with the largest base of Facebook users outside the United States are
classified by the United Nations and World Health Organization as “lowincome” and “lower-middle-income” countries based on their gross domestic

32
Press Release, Office of the Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Commerce Department Prohibits WeChat
and TikTok Transactions to Protect the National Security of the United States (Sept. 18, 2020), https://content.
govdelivery.com/accounts/USDOC/bulletins/2a14c6c.
33
Matt O'Brien, Eric Tucker & Tali Arbel, US Drops Trump Order Targeting TikTok, Plans Its Own
Review, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 9, 2021), https://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/white-house-dropstrump-orders-ban-tiktok-wechat-78172937.
34
Office of the Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, supra note 32.
35
Number of Monthly Active Facebook Users Worldwide as of 2nd Quarter 2020, STATISTA (Aug. 10,
2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide
(last visited Feb. 5, 2020).
36
Leading Countries Based on Facebook Audience Size as of July 2020, STATISTA (July 24, 2020)
[hereinafter Leading Countries], https://www.statista.com/statistics/268136/top-15-countries-based-onnumber-of-facebook-users (last visited Feb. 5, 2020).
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product.37 These countries are politically less stable or governed by relatively
young democracies, and are more inclined to upheaval, oligarchic rule, and
corruption.38 The fact that a global, democratic platform predicated on free
discourse is accessed in countries under nascent democratic regimes places
Facebook in an unusually influential position few nations or international
organizations hold.39
Beyond its ethical and moral obligations, it is equally important to note how
Facebook’s obligations are intrinsically linked to its bottom line. At the end of
the second fiscal quarter of 2020, Facebook reported an estimated revenue of
$18.69 billion dollars.40 In the midst of a global pandemic and economic
recession, Facebook has continued to not only generate a profit, but also increase
its annual revenue by 21.6% thanks to its global market.41
As of February 2020, Myanmar is the nineteenth-largest country of users
outside the United States.42 With an estimated population of roughly 54.8
million people,43 almost half of Myanmar’s population uses Facebook.44
Following the targeted attacks against the Rohingya people over the past decade,
what has Facebook done to ensure similar acts do not persist in Myanmar or
anywhere else in the world? While this Comment does not directly evaluate
issues of corporate accountability within the context of criminal liability for
genocidal acts, these questions are undoubtedly relevant in understanding the
global ramifications of Facebook’s policies.
2. Facebook’s Content-Moderation Problem: Break Fast, Fix Slow
After starting out in a garage of a one-story ranch-style home in the sleepy
suburb of Palo Alto in 2004, Facebook founder, Mark Zuckerberg, often credits

37
U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, World Economic Situation and Prospects 168 (2019), https://www.
un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/WESP2019_BOOK-ANNEX-en.pdf.
38
See Freedom Score of Countries and Territories, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/
countries/freedom-world/scores (last visited Oct. 26, 2020).
39
Mark Zuckerberg, Bringing the World Closer Together, FACEBOOK (June 22, 2017), https://www.
facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/bringing-the-world-closer-together/10154944663901634.
40
FB Revenue EPS, NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/market-activity/stocks/fb/revenue-eps (last
visited Oct. 26, 2020); Facebook Revenue 2009-2020 | FB, MACROTRENDS, https://www.macrotrends.net/
stocks/charts/FB/facebook/revenue (last visited Oct. 26, 2020).
41
Id.
42
Leading Countries, supra note 36.
43
Myanmar Population 2020, WORLD POPULATION REV., https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/
myanmar-population (last visited Oct. 26, 2020).
44
Twenty-seven million accounts exist in Myanmar. Leading Countries, supra note 36. This is assuming
each person only has one account. The relative proportion remains significant even if some duplicates exist.
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the company’s meteoric rise to its mentality to “move fast and break things.”45
Prioritizing speed, disruptive innovation, and creativity, three years would pass
before Facebook began to consider moderating content on its platform.46 The
initial guidelines spanned one page and were often quipped into one sentence:
“If something makes you feel bad in your gut, take it down.”47 Typical of most
tech startups, Facebook’s first head of content policy was an internal hire who
had two years of work experience out of college.48 He and a team of twelve other
recent college graduates were tasked to update the page-long guidelines into a
more foundational framework (now the “Community Standards”) to which
content moderators still refer to determine when to flag, but not remove, content
considered “disturbing.”49 Facebook’s earliest content moderators, and first
head of the content policy team, have since left the company to lead similar
teams at Pinterest and Airbnb respectively.50 Facebook has also expanded its
content-moderation team internationally,51 and has increasingly incorporated
automated content-moderation tools based on machine learning and artificial
intelligence to address the ramping surplus of reviewable content worldwide.52
On one hand, the internal standards for content moderation appear to “comprise
an ever-changing wiki[.]”53 However, the substantive content of the
“Community Standards” has essentially remained the same since its inception in
the early 2000s.54 Considering the lack of more substantive changes in its
content policies, Facebook unsurprisingly has continued to face widespread

45
Samantha Murphy, Facebook Changes Its ‘Move Fast and Break Things’ Motto, MASHABLE (Apr. 30,
2014), https://mashable.com/2014/04/30/facebooks-new-mantra-move-fast-with-stability.
46
Andrew Marantz, Why Facebook Can’t Fix Itself, NEW YORKER (Oct. 12. 2020), https://www.
newyorker.com/magazine/2020/10/19/why-facebook-cant-fix-itself.
47
Id.
48
Id.; Steven Levy, The Guy Who Wrote Facebook’s Content Rules Says Its Politician Hate Speech
Exemption Is ‘Cowardice’, WIRED (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-content-standardspoliticians-exemption-dave-willner; Dave Willner, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/davewillner (last
visited Oct. 27, 2020).
49
Marantz, supra note 46.
50
Id.
51
Casey Newton, Bodies in Seats, VERGE (June 19, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/19/
18681845/facebook-moderator-interviews-video-trauma-ptsd-cognizant-tampa.
52
Svea Windwehr & Jillian C. York, Facebook’s Most Recent Transparency Report Demonstrates the
Pitfalls of Automated Content Moderation, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2020/10/facebooks-most-recent-transparency-report-demonstrates-pitfalls-automated-content.
53
Marantz, supra note 46.
54
Id. (“As far as I can tell, the bulk of the document I wrote hasn’t changed all that much,

surprisingly,” Dave Willner told me. “But they’ve made some big carve-outs that are just absolute
nonsense. There’s no perfect approach to content moderation, but they could at least try to look less
transparently craven and incoherent.”).
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scrutiny for failing to enforce clearer and more consistent standards in
moderating content.55
In December 2017, a Facebook employee flagged a Guardian article about
Britain First to determine whether the company needed to ban the group after
YouTube and Twitter announced they were banning the “hate group” from their
platforms.56 The public policy director of the trust and safety team
acknowledged “Britain First share[d] many of the common tenets of alt-right
groups, e.g., ultra-nationalism,”57 but ultimately concluded Facebook did not
consider Britain First a hate organization and would leave its content alone until
further notice. A Muslim Facebook employee replied that the leader of the group
had recently been convicted of hate crimes against British Muslims and asked
how this could have been overlooked.58 Before leadership from the contentmoderating teams responded or took further action in the upcoming weeks,
Darren Osborne, a British white supremacist, was convicted of murder after
driving a van into a London mosque, killing one man and injuring nine others.59
The judge ruled the incident “a terrorist act” and concluded Osborne had been
“rapidly radicalized over the Internet” after reviewing evidence of Osborne
following Britain First and its leaders on social media.60 Six weeks following
Osborne’s conviction and almost three months after its employees initially
inquired about banning Britain First, Facebook finally banned the group and its
leader.61 It is unclear based on the timeline and facts alone to definitively
determine whether Osborne would not have been so “rapidly radicalized,” had
Facebook acted sooner in banning Britain First from its platform. In the end, the
judge determined Osborne had been deeply influenced by multiple sources,
including a BBC miniseries, and did not specify which social media outlets
Osborne had used to follow Britain First and its leaders.62 Nevertheless, the
internal exchanges of Facebook employees and lack of timely action from
leadership illustrate the ultimate fallacy in Facebook’s ad hoc approach to
moderating sensitive content. It would be one thing had this been an isolated
incident and not resulted in actual harm. However, as this Comment will later
discuss in the case of Myanmar, these events are not uncommon and
55

See id.
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. (emphasis added) (citing R. v. Darren Osborne [2018] Woolwich Crown Court [7b] (sentencing
remarks) (UK)).
61
Id.; Alex Hern & Kevin Rawlinson, Facebook Bans Britain First and Its Leaders, GUARDIAN (Mar. 14,
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/14/facebook-bans-britain-first-and-its-leaders.
62
Marantz, supra note 46.
56
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unfortunately have the capability of inflicting devastating harm on hundreds of
thousands of innocent people when left unchecked. What is perhaps most
troubling is that Facebook continues to overlook its failures and instead
maintains a relatively conservative and reactive approach to reviewing
incendiary content.
In October 2020 for example, Mark Zuckerberg announced the platform
would now ban claims purporting to deny the existence of the Holocaust under
its newly updated hate speech policy.63 In justifying this reversal of Facebook’s
previous policy in maintaining diverse forms of free expression at all costs,
Zuckerberg explained his “thinking ha[d] evolved [after reviewing] data
showing an increase in anti-Semitic violence . . .”64 In light of mounting public
pressure to take more aggressive stances against hate speech and other
incendiary content,65 Facebook has struggled to balance the competing interests
of maintaining a neutral, passive forum for free speech while also minimizing
harm caused by inciteful speech and misinformation.66 Public reception of
Zuckerberg’s about-face remained mixed. Some advocacy groups praised the
company for finally listening to their requests to take down Holocaust denial,67
while others insisted more issues in addition to the Holocaust needed to be
banned under the company’s hate speech policy.68
While Facebook has continued to spend billions of dollars on its contentmoderation operations,69 including paying out a $52 million settlement to former
content moderators who developed PTSD as a result of inadequate
psychological support and mismanagement,70 these two occasions alone
63
Mark Zuckerberg (/zuck), FACEBOOK (Oct. 12, 2020, 10:05 AM), https://www.facebook.com/zuck/
posts/10112455086578451.
64
Id.
65
Shannon Bond, Over 400 Advertisers Hit Pause on Facebook, Threatening $70 Billion Juggernaut,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 1, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/01/885853634/big-brands-abandon-facebookthreatening-to-derail-a-70b-advertising-juggernaut.
66
See Shannon Bond, Facebook Bans Holocaust Denial, Reversing Earlier Policy, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/10/12/923002012/facebook-bans-holocaust-denial-reversing-earlierpolicy?utm_term=nprnews&utm_campaign=npr&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_medium=social&fbclid=I
wAR2N0tIXvj9_RYLNT4TV8fyAU0ZMA9Onqa0cjeaeqB5ZBZUDYl8faGe0WgU; Marantz, supra note 46.
67
See Claims Conference (@ClaimsCon), TWITTER (Oct. 12, 2020, 11:01 AM), https://twitter.com/
ClaimsCon/status/1315668929600253952 (“Survivors spoke! Facebook listened”).
68
As of October 2020, the top three comments receiving more than 500 likes and eliciting more than fifty
replies hoped to see other genocides included, as well as hate speech and violent threats in countries such as
Azerbaijan, Armenia, and India. Zuckerberg, supra note 63.
69
Marantz, supra note 46.
70
Casey Newton, Facebook Will Pay $52 Million in Settlement with Moderators Who Developed PTSD
on the Job, VERGE (May 12, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/5/12/21255870/facebook-contentmoderator-settlement-scola-ptsd-mental-health.
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illustrate how Facebook has fallen short of fulfilling its original mission to
“move fast and break things.”71 More importantly, Facebook has fundamentally
failed to gain control and accept ownership of the problem. This could not be
clearer than by what transpired in Myanmar throughout 2011 to 2017 and how
Facebook responded.
B. What Happened in Myanmar: the Rohingya Crisis in the Making of
Democracy
In 2017, Muslim insurgents of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
attacked thirty police posts and government army bases.72 In response, Burmese
military officials conducted “clearance operations” in the northern state of
Rakhine the next day, resulting in hundreds of thousands of Rohingya people
fleeing to neighboring Bangladesh.73 Within the first month of the campaign
initiated by armed government troops and buttressed by local civilian mobs, at
least 6700 Rohingya civilians died, including 730 children, and 288 villages
were destroyed.74 In the wake of the initial attacks, the U.N. Human Rights High
Commissioner decried the military operation as a “textbook example of ethnic
cleansing” and the Rohingya minority became known as “one of, if not the, most
discriminated people of the world” according to the U.N. Secretary-General
Antonio Guterres.75
1. Events Leading Up to the 2017 Military Crackdown in Rakhine:
Facebook—Panacea or Pandora’s Box?
Historically viewed as illegal immigrants originating from Bangladesh
starting in the 1970s, the Rohingya people have long been denied basic rights of
citizenship and freedom of movement in Myanmar.76 They have been
systemically discriminated to such an extent that the Buddhist-majority
government refused to recognize their existence and excluded them from the
country’s census in 2014.77 Even before Burmese military officials instigated
71

Murphy, supra note 45.
‘Textbook Example of Ethnic Cleansing’: A Timeline of the Rohingya Crisis, REUTERS (Aug. 21, 2020)
[hereinafter Textbook Example], https://thewire.in/world/textbook-example-of-ethnic-cleansing-a-timeline-ofthe-rohingya-crisis.
73
See generally Myanmar Rohingya: What You Need to Know About the Crisis, BBC (Jan. 23, 2020)
[hereinafter What You Need to Know], https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561 (providing overview of
key events of the Rohingya Genocide).
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
72
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their deadly crackdown against what should have been limited to Rohingya
“militants” in 2017, thousands of civilians had already begun to flee in preceding
years due to persistent and targeted abuse stemming from rising Burmese
nationalism and deep-seated anti-Muslim sentiment.78
Starting in 2010, violence between Muslims and Buddhists began to flare
dangerously as government restrictions on speech, internet access, and mobile
networks lessened dramatically—seemingly overnight—and fueled a maelstrom
of misinformation mainly against Rohingya Muslims.79 Inflammatory photos on
Instagram captioned with false claims of Muslims aiding British colonial
authorities against Burmese independence activists in the 1940s, as well as
graphic posts with incendiary hashtags accusing local Muslim men of raping
Buddhist women, are just a few examples of misinformation that went viral
across the newly-open country in the early 2010s.80
In 2011, with a total population of around 51 million people, less than one
percent of the country had access to the internet and only 1.3 million people were
mobile subscribers.81 In the last decade, twenty-five percent of the population
gained access to the internet and ninety percent obtained mobile phones,
increasing the number of mobile subscribers to 49 million. In a poll, thirty-eight
percent of respondents stated they had preferred reading news on Facebook over
state-run newspapers.82 As the country’s telecommunications sector rapidly
opened its public markets to foreign investment—including telecom providers,
smartphone manufacturers, and internet service providers like Google and
Facebook83—during this time, it is no coincidence that the viral proliferation of
misinformation systematically disseminated by Burmese military officials
coincided with waves of violence across the country. In 2012, almost 200 people
were killed and 140,000 were displaced as anti-Muslim riots precipitating from
online rumors and falsified stories rippled across the country.84 In 2013, violence
reached central Myanmar and coalesced onto a small town where a brutal killing

78

Id.
Timothy McLaughlin, How Facebook’s Rise Fueled Chaos and Confusion in Myanmar, WIRED
(July 6, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/how-facebooks-rise-fueled-chaos-and-confusion-in-myanmar.
80
Paul Mozur, A Genocide Incited on Facebook, with Posts from Myanmar’s Military, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology/myanmar-facebook-genocide.html.
81
Population, Total–Myanmar, WORLD BANK GROUP [WBG], https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.
POP.TOTL?locations=MM (last visited Sept. 3, 2021); McLaughlin, supra note 79.
82
McLaughlin, supra note 79.
83
Id.
84
The Dark Side of Transition: Violence Against Muslims in Myanmar, INT’L CRISIS GRP. (Oct. 1, 2013),
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/dark-side-transition-violence-against-muslimsmyanmar.
79
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of a Buddhist monk over a dispute in a local shop resulted in two days of riots
and left forty-four dead, including twenty Muslim students and several
teachers.85 In 2014, hundreds swarmed into a tea stand in Myanmar’s secondlargest city, Mandalay, after false rumors of a Muslim tea shop owner raping a
female Buddhist employee circulated on Facebook.86 The ensuing violence from
the Mandalay tea shop riots continued to spread to the country’s capital more
than 170 miles away, leading concerned officials and foreign correspondents to
alert Facebook about shutting down the site, at least temporarily, until the
violence subsided.87
Despite ongoing talks with Facebook’s Director of Policy in the Asia-Pacific
Region and Global Director of Communications at the company’s headquarters
in Silicon Valley, it would take another fourteen months before the company
instituted Burmese user guidelines to oversee online conduct and content
belonging to over 18 million users in Myanmar.88 Meanwhile, Facebook only
had one Burmese speaker, based in Dublin, Ireland, to review content that
potentially violated these community standards.89 Consistent with its previous
responses to Burmese officials, as well as later incidents including the internal
warning about Britain First in 2017, Facebook failed to adequately address the
rapidly escalating situation precipitating from the Mandalay riots in a timely and
comprehensive manner. Instead, Facebook remained painstakingly reactive,
mired in bureaucratic handwringing that permitted the unchecked spread of fake
accounts and viral misinformation for years.
2. What Happened After: Response from the International Community
Following the initial reports of the 2017 military crackdown in Rakhine,
investigative reports from journalists and international human rights
organizations began sourcing evidence from Facebook as well as obtaining
satellite images to alert relevant international bodies of potential signs of
genocide and crimes against humanity.90 After establishing the Independent
International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (IIFFMM) in 2017, the
UNHRC concluded the following year that the Myanmar military had carried
85

Id.
Shwe Aung, False Rape Claim Cause Riots, Says Ministry, DVB (July 21, 2014), http://www.dvb.no/
news/false-rape-claim-caused-riots-says-ministry-burma-myanmar/42617.
87
McLaughlin, supra note 79.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
See Mozur, supra note 80; Kevin Roose, Forget Washington. Facebook’s Problems Abroad Are Far
More Disturbing, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/29/business/facebookmisinformation-abroad.html.
86
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out mass killings and rapes with “genocidal intent.”91 The report estimated more
than 10,000 people had been killed and hundreds of thousands remained
displaced, but conceded an exact number of casualties was not likely to be
calculable.92 In 2019, the IIFFMM reaffirmed its previous finding that
“Myanmar incurs State responsibility under the prohibition against genocide”
and welcomed the Gambia to file suit against Myanmar before the ICJ.93
a. Gambia v. Myanmar (Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide)
On behalf of dozens of other Muslim nations, the Muslim-majority Republic
of the Gambia filed suit against Myanmar under Genocide Convention, to which
both are parties and thus subject to the jurisdiction of the ICJ.94 In its suit, the
Gambia “s[ought] to hold Myanmar accountable under international law for
commission of the crime of genocide against the Rohingya people . . . and to
obtain an order from the ICJ that Myanmar, inter alia, cease and desist from
further acts of genocide against the Rohingya.”95 Specifically, the Gambia
asserted Myanmar violated Article II of the Genocide Convention, which
prohibits killing, causing serious bodily and mental harm, inflicting conditions
that are calculated to bring about physical destruction, and imposing measures
to prevent births—with the intent to destroy the Rohingya, in whole or in part.96
On January 23, 2020, the ICJ unanimously (17–0) granted the Gambia’s request
to order Myanmar to “take all measures within its power to prevent the
commission of all acts of genocide against the Rohingya people.”97 In Fall 2020,
Canada and the Netherlands also released a joint statement indicating their
intentions to intervene in the ongoing ICJ proceeding with the Gambia against
Myanmar out of an “obligation to support” the Genocide Convention, because
genocides “are of concern to all of humanity.”98
91
Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the Indep. Int’l Fact-Finding Mission on
Myan., U.N. DOC. A/HRC/39/64, at 14 (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/
HRCouncil/FFM-Myanmar/A_HRC_39_64.pdf; see Evelyn Douek, Facebook’s Role in the Genocide in
Myanmar: New Reporting Complicates the Narrative, LAWFARE (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.
com//facebooks-role-genocide-myanmar-new-reporting-complicates-narrative.
92
See Douek, supra note 91.
93
ICJ Order, supra note 17, at 9.
94
Memorandum of Law in Support of the Republic of Gam.’s Application for Order to Take Discovery
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 at 1, Gambia v. Facebook, Inc., (D.D.C. filed June 8, 2020) (No. 1:20-mc-00036JEB) [hereinafter Memorandum].
95
Id.
96
See ICJ Order, supra note 17, at ¶ 12(a).
97
ICJ Order, supra note 17, at ¶¶ 71–76.
98
Joint Statement of Canada and the Kingdom of the Netherlands Regarding Intention to Intervene in the
Gambia v. Myanmar case at the International Court of Justice (Sept. 2, 2020) https://www.government.nl/
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b. International Condemnation Over Facebook’s Implication: Bearing
the “Hallmarks of Genocide”99
During its interim investigations of potential genocide in Myanmar in early
2018, the chairman of the U.N. Independent Fact-Finding Mission (IFFM)
presented damning conclusions regarding Facebook’s “determining role” in
Myanmar:
[Social media] has . . . substantively contributed to the level of
acrimony and dissension and conflict . . . within the public. Hate
speech is certainly of course a part of that. As far as the Myanmar
situation is concerned, social media is Facebook, and Facebook is
social media.100

The U.N. Myanmar Investigator and Special Rapporteur echoed these findings
after reviewing over 600 interviews with victims and witnesses, as well as
satellite images and videos, reiterating “[e]verything is done through Facebook
in Myanmar . . . I’m afraid that Facebook has now turned into a beast . . . .”101
The UNHRC published its Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) report in late 2018
finding Facebook had a “significant role” in disseminating hate speech and
inciting acts of violence against Rohingya civilians. Since then, a considerable
amount of scholarship has been devoted to studying Facebook’s legal
obligations in curbing efforts to incite genocide in countries especially prone to
human rights violations and authoritarian control.102 In fact, some scholars have
questioned whether Facebook should face criminal liability helping incite
violence against the Rohingya people and repeatedly failing to take more
proactive and consistent measures in moderating content before and after the
FFM report.103 While questions of attributing criminal liability for Facebook’s
documents/diplomatic-statements/2020/09/02/joint-statement-of-canada-and-the-kingdom-of-the-netherlandsregarding-intention-to-intervene-in-the-gambia-v.-myanmar-case-at-the-international-court-of-justice.
99
McLaughlin, supra note 79.
100
Tom Miles, U.N. Investigators Cite Facebook Role in Myanmar Crisis, REUTERS (Mar. 12, 2018)
(quotations omitted), https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-facebook/u-n-investigators-cite-facebookrole-in-myanmar-crisis-idUKKCN1GO2PN.
101
Id.
102
See, e.g., Jenny Domino, Regulation of Social Media: Crime as Cognitive Constraint: Facebook’s Role
in Myanmar’s Incitement Landscape and the Promise of International Tort Liability, 51 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L
L. 143 (2020) (exploring criminal liability for Facebook’s role in inciting violence in Myanmar); David Sloss,
Regulation of Social Media: Section 230 and the Duty to Prevent Mass Atrocities, 51 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.
199 (2020) (outlining regulatory limitations and potential civil liability for internet companies complicit in
genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity). See generally Douek, supra note 91 (analyzing Facebook’s
direct role in inciting violence following news reports on systemic use for spreading misinformation).
103
See, e.g., Neema Hakim, Comment, How Social Media Companies Could Be Complicit in Incitement
to Genocide, 21 CHI. J. INT’L L. 83, 106–07 (2020) (arguing corporate and intentional criminal liability can be
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role in the Rohingya genocide are outside the scope of this Comment, it is worth
considering the extent of Facebook’s legal obligations relating to the Rohingya
genocide.
c. Facebook’s Proverbial Balancing Act: Safeguarding Freedom of
Expression and Privacy Versus Regulating Speech
Leading up to the initial findings of the FFM in 2018, Facebook faced a
collective front of public scrutiny from the press,104 human rights
organizations,105 and governments106 over its profound mishandling of the
spread of misinformation during the Rohingya genocide.107 Just a few days prior
to the release of the FFM, Facebook’s Chief Operating Officer, Sheryl Sandberg,
unexpectedly conceded before the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee that the
company not only had a moral, but also a legal obligation to take down accounts
that incited violence in Myanmar.108 Once the FFM report was published, the
U.N.-commissioned IFFM concluded Facebook’s efforts to stem further
escalations were “slow and ineffective,” and ultimately directed the company to
undergo an independent audit to further investigate the extent the social media
posts incited violence and increased hostilities toward the Rohingya Muslims in
Myanmar.109 In response, the company launched the Facebook Oversight Board
a month later, self-described as an “appellate review system for user content
[that would independently] make content-moderation policy recommendations
to Facebook.”110

imposed on executives as well as responsible employees); Yue, supra note 25, at 835 (positing Facebook could
face criminal liability given numerous warnings of platform misuse from civil society organizations).
104
Mozur, supra note 80.
105
Myanmar: UN Fact-Finding Mission Releases its Full Account of Massive Violations by Military in
Rakhine, Kachin and Shan States, HUM. RTS. COUNCIL (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/
HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=23575&LangID=E.
106
See Evelyn Douek, Senate Hearing on Social Media and Foreign Influence Operations: Progress, but
There’s a Long Way to Go, LAWFARE (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/senate-hearing-socialmedia-and-foreign-influence-operations-progress-theres-long-way-go.
107
See, e.g., Alastair Jamieson, U.N. Says Facebook ‘Slow’ to Respond to Myanmar ‘Genocide’ Against
Rohingya, NBC NEWS (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u-n-says-facebook-slowrespond-myanmar-genocide-against-rohingya (reporting on UN findings Facebook’s delayed response in
removing several key military officials from its platform “slow and ineffective”); see also Kate Klonick, The
Facebook Oversight Board: Creating an Independent Institution to Adjudicate Online Free Expression, 129
YALE L.J. 2418, 2447–48 (2020) (noting how public controversies including Facebook’s implication in
Myanmar crisis precipitated creation of Oversight Board).
108
See Douek, supra note 106.
109
See Douek, supra note 91.
110
Klonick, supra note 107.
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Despite these initial efforts to streamline its content-moderation policies to
become more transparent and democratic, concurrent concerns of data privacy
have hindered independent third parties from holding Facebook fully
accountable. Specifically, in the wake of the Cambridge Analytica scandal
uncovering how Facebook data collection policies had been compromised,
Facebook began limiting third-party access to its platform searches in an effort
to curb future security breaches and bolster public confidence.111 This included
disabling a popular feature called Graph Search, which previously allowed users
to find public content not easily searchable through general keyword queries.112
For non-governmental organizations with modest resources, features like Graph
Search were indispensable tools in their advocacy efforts and independent
investigations.113 In fact, international watchdogs and advocacy organizations
specifically relied on Graph Search to find implicating videos of a wanted
Libyan war criminal conducting extrajudicial executions.114 These videos were
later used to secure an arrest warrant—the ICC’s first arrest warrant based on
social media content.115 More importantly, human rights organizations used
Graph Search to find posts linking Myanmar military groups to crimes against
humanity and acts of genocide against the Rohingya minority from 2011 to
2017.116 Now without warning, war-crime investigators and human rights
organizations found themselves severely restricted in their investigatory
capabilities.117
At the same time, the social media giant had implemented changes signaling
new efforts to prevent further violence in Myanmar.118 In particular, the
111
Craig Silverman, Journalists Are Criticizing Facebook for Its Data Collection. At the Same Time, They
Often Use It to Their Advantage, BUZZFEED (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/
craigsilverman/facebook-cambridge-analytica-journalism-data-criticism-osint.
112
Craig Silverman, Facebook Turned Off Search Features Used to Catch War Criminals, Child
Predators, and Other Bad Actors, BUZZFEED (June 10, 2019), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/
craigsilverman/facebook-graph-search-war-crimes.
113
Sam Dubberley, How Facebook’s Sudden Change Hinders Human Rights Investigators, AMNESTY
INT’L (June 17, 2019), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/06/how-facebooks-sudden-change-hindershuman-rights-investigations.
114
Id.; see also Libya: Special Forces Commander Apparently Filmed Committing Extrajudicial
Executions Must Be Handed Over to the ICC, AMNESTY INT’L (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.amnesty.org/en/
latest/news/2018/01/libya-special-forces-commander-apparently-filmed-committing-extrajudicial-executionsmust-be-handed-over-to-the-icc.
115
Emma Irving, And so It Begins… Social Media Evidence in an ICC Arrest Warrant, OPINIO JURIS
(Aug. 17, 2017), https://opiniojuris.org/2017/08/17/and-so-it-begins-social-media-evidence-in-an-icc-arrestwarrant.
116
Dubberley, supra note 113.
117
Shu, supra note 22.
118
See Sara Su, Update on Myanmar, FACEBOOK (Aug. 15, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/
08/update-on-myanmar.
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company recently created a dedicated taskforce of engineers and product
managers to work on issues specific to Myanmar, such as updating its coding
bases to identify and decipher various Burmese languages and font styles, as
well as increasing the number of Burmese content moderators to over 100
language experts.119 Despite these announced changes, at least one press outlet
and human rights organization identified thousands of posts, photos, and videos
maligning Rohingya minorities that remained viewable online the same day
Facebook announced their updated policies targeting the Myanmar crisis.120
Despite these proposed internal changes, it is unclear how sustainable and
effective this country-specific model will be in the long-term. Imminent threats
of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other crimes against humanity fueled by hate
speech will inevitably arise in other areas of the world.
II. LEGAL ISSUES ARISING FROM GAMBIA V. FACEBOOK
A. The Essential Role Technology Companies Play in International Discovery
and the Significance of Gambia v. Facebook
While foreign requests for data disclosure will only increase in the evolving
arena of privacy law in the United States, international discovery remains firmly
rooted in statutory analysis. Within the last two decades, governments and law
enforcement agencies around the world have increasingly relied on tech
companies to provide user information for ongoing criminal investigations.121
However, there remains relatively little case law on issues arising from states
demanding data from tech companies, let alone within the context of genocide
investigations.
Generally speaking, disputes over data disclosure are usually resolved
privately between the requesting governments and in-house legal teams
responding to the requests. Due to the ongoing nature of their investigations,
government officials require confidentiality and secure lengthy, and often
indefinite, non-disclosure orders to accompany their legal process.122 Similarly,
119

See id.
Steve Stecklow, Why Facebook Is Losing the War on Hate Speech in Myanmar, REUTERS (Aug. 15,
2018, 3:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-facebook-hate (“[M]ore than
1,000 examples Reuters found of posts, comments, images and videos attacking the Rohingya or other Myanmar
Muslims that were on Facebook as of last week. . . . collected by Reuters and the Human Rights Center at UC
Berkeley School of Law – includes material that’s been up on Facebook for as long as six years.”).
121
Hill, supra note 18.
122
See, e.g., DROPBOX, TRANSPARENCY REPORT, http://www.dropbox.com/transparency/reports (last
visited Oct. 26, 2020) (“33.7% of the search warrants we received [from July through December 2019]
120

were accompanied by court orders for non-disclosure of indefinite duration. These gag orders may prevent
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technology companies prefer to take the path of least resistance when handling
sensitive requests for user information by (1) denying overly broad requests
whenever possible; (2) disclosing non-content information, such as basic
subscriber information when compelled; and (3) requiring greater particularity
for more detailed content.123 In the end, these industry practices are meant to act
as important safeguards against unwarranted government interference with the
user’s inherent right to privacy.124 In rare instances where parties are unable to
resolve data-disclosure disputes behind closed doors and proceed to litigation,
courts still employ wide discretion when determining whether to grant
disclosure under 28 U.S.C. § 1782.125 Due to shifting notions of privacy and
wide-ranging implications that may arise in these high-profile cases, courts have
historically been reluctant to establish blanket, per se rules. However, this caseby-case analysis also subjects parties to unpredictable statutory interpretations
around international data disclosure.
In addition to the general considerations for compulsory data disclosures,
courts have begun to consider questions of direct causality in cases involving
genocide.126 U.N. War Crimes Tribunals for Rwanda and Nuremburg have
historically identified speech as a prominent factor in fomenting mass atrocities
and genocide.127 However, scholars have yet to agree on how hate speech and
propaganda can directly trigger these escalations.128 The recent advent of social
media being wielded as an effective tool for authoritarian governments and
military officials as seen in Myanmar further complicates these questions of
causality in international law. However, as one scholar notes, Myanmar could
be the “first social-media fueled ethnic cleansing.”129 Moreover, the extensive

us from ever notifying 33% of the affected Dropbox users identified in search warrants we received of
the fact that law enforcement requested their information.”).
123
See, e.g., id. (“Government data requests should be limited in the information they seek and narrowly
tailored to specific people and legitimate investigations. We’ll resist blanket and overly broad requests.”).
124
See, e.g., id.
125
See infra Part II.C.1; Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 260–61 (2004) (“Nor
does § 1782(a)'s legislative history suggest that Congress intended to impose a blanket foreign-discoverability
rule on the provision of assistance under § 1782(a). The Senate Report observes in this regard that § 1782(a)
"leaves the issuance of an appropriate order to the discretion of the court which, in proper cases, may

refuse to issue an order or may impose conditions it deems desirable.").
126
Richard Ashby Wilson, Inciting Genocide with Words, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 277, 280–81 (2015),
http://www.mjilonline.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Wilson.pdf.
127
See id. at 278–79.
128
See Jonathan L. Maynard & Susan Benesch, Dangerous Speech and Dangerous Ideology: An
Integrated Model for Monitoring and Prevention, GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 70, 70–71 (2016), https://
scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1317&context=gsp.
129
Zeynep Tufekci (@zeynep), TWITTER (July 22, 2013), https://twitter.com/zeynep/status/35936860616
6958080; see Douek, supra note 91.
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findings of the FFM reports on the 2017 attacks in Northern Myanmar have
indicated that there is “no doubt that the prevalence of hate speech in Myanmar
significantly contributed to increased tension and a climate in which individuals
and groups may become more receptive to incitement and calls for violence . . .
[such that the] role of social media is significant.”130
Focusing on Gambia v. Facebook allows for a timely analysis of these
overarching ambiguities in international data disclosure. More importantly, a
case analysis of Gambia v. Facebook narrows the discussion to cases of
genocide, in which enforcing international humanitarian law can be a more
compelling government interest when weighed against the usual interests in
upholding user privacy and free speech and minimizing burdens of disclosure.
This holds especially true as courts begin to consider the evidentiary power of
social media content.
For instance, in 2017, the ICC issued its first arrest warrant based on
evidence found on social media.131 Signaling the court’s willingness to consider
“open-source” evidence, this arrest warrant opens up the range of evidence
available for discovery and has wide-ranging implications for potential
witnesses, victims, and perpetrators around the world.132 The sheer proliferation
of content available on social media in various forms of video, photo, and text
can 1) provide the court a clearer picture of the circumstances surrounding the
alleged offenses;133 2) lower the evidentiary burden of locating content that is
widely accessible to the public and posted on prominent social media platforms;
and 3) help establish more direct causal connections to those responsible,
especially given the increasing practice of perpetrators taking credit or directly
uploading content for propaganda purposes.134 The implications for the
Gambia’s case against Myanmar are even greater as the Gambia seeks to review
social media posts uploaded by key military officials and organizations allegedly
responsible for mass atrocities against an entire ethnic group over a near span of
a decade.135

130

See Douek, supra note 91.
Irving, supra note 115.
132
Id.
133
Id. (indicating charge of murder based on seven videos showing defendant shooting and ordering others
to execute individuals).
134
Id.
135
Memorandum, supra note 94, at 18–20.
131
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B. Facebook Should Be Compelled to Disclose the Requested Information
Due to the Exigent Conditions of the Rohingya Crisis
Despite heightened international scrutiny in the wake of the 2017 military
purge and U.N. findings, the Burmese government has consistently denied
carrying out genocide, admitting only to possible “war crimes, serious human
rights violations, and violations of domestic law.”136 Leading the defense, Nobel
Peace Prize laureate and former human rights activist Aung San Suu Kyi
categorically denied allegations of genocide while appearing before the ICJ this
past December.137
Meanwhile, ongoing armed conflict between the Myanmar military and
minority factions under the Arakan Army continues to exacerbate instability for
the remaining 500,000 Rohingya civilians caught in the crossfire,138 as well as
diminishes any prospects of returning home for the 730,000 displaced Rohingya
refugees in neighboring Bangladesh.139 As the Burmese government proceeds to
reinstate “clearance operations” and imposes selective internet shutdowns or
restrictions on vulnerable minority communities, the ICJ and humanitarian
organizations have repeatedly urged for greater access to, and attention on, the
strife-filled Rakhine and Chin states.140 In an effort to stem the crisis, the ICJ
enjoined Myanmar in early 2020 to take emergency measures in preventing
further acts of genocide against the Rohingya people and preserve relevant
evidence for the IFFM.141 In response, the Myanmar Government issued
directives to its regional and state governments to follow suit by halting “hate
speech”142 and preserving evidence and property in northern Rakhine, Kachin,
and Shan states.143 However, the Independent Commission of Enquiry
136
Myanmar Panel: Security Forces Likely Committed War Crimes, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS (Jan. 20,
2020), https://apnews.com/article/9809bbcacf8031c80271b69da3bdf45f.
137
Id.
138
See UNHCR Concerned at Mounting Civilian Casualties and Displacement in Western Myanmar, U.N.
HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2020/3/5e7dbca44/unhcrconcerned-mounting-civilian-casualties-displacement-western-myanmar.html (reporting on thousands of
civilians displaced due to armed conflict and government-imposed “clearance operations”); Myanmar Begins
Probe of WHO Staff Killing in Rakhine Amid Skepticism, RADIO FREE ASIA (May 14, 2020), https://www.rfa.org/
english/news/myanmar/investigative-committee-05142020194103.html (investigating death of WHO staff
member after vehicle bearing WHO logo and transporting COVID-19 test samples came under fire).
139
Myanmar: “Possible War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity Ongoing in Rakhine and Chin States"
– UN Special Rapporteur Yanghee Lee, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMM’R (Apr. 29, 2020), https://
www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25838&LangID=E.
140
Atrocity Alert No. 275: Myanmar (Burma), Libya and Cameroon, GLOB. CTR. FOR RESP. TO PROTECT,
(Oct. 20, 2021), https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/atrocity-alert-no-275.
141
See Domino, supra note 102.
142
President Directive No. 3/2020 (Apr. 20, 2020) (Myan.).
143
President Directive No. 2/2020 (Apr. 8, 2020) (Myan.).

KIM_4.25.22

2022]

4/25/2022 5:33 PM

TECH ACCOUNTABILITY IN FACE OF GENOCIDE

189

established by the Myanmar Government to investigate human rights violations
in Rakhine has limited fact-finding capabilities and can be partial toward the
government.144 In light of the recent coup staged by the Myanmar military, it is
highly unlikely the Commission will continue investigating human rights
violations in Rakhine.
While Myanmar persists in a purgatory state of crisis, Bangladesh is now
overextended with over 740,000 Rohingya taking refuge within its borders.145
Due to overwhelming demand and limited resources, Bangladesh announced last
year it would no longer accept more refugees and would instead work with
Myanmar to repatriate those willing to return.146 Bangladesh attempted to submit
a repatriation bid with the U.N. refugee agency in 2019, but the bid eventually
failed after no refugee volunteered to return to Myanmar.147 Instead, more
Rohingya Muslims continue to flee Myanmar. In April 2020, Bangladesh
rescued 396 Rohingya caught at sea after their boat failed to land in Malaysia,
leaving thirty-two dead.148 Soon after, the U.N. Envoy to Myanmar reported the
Myanmar Government continued to commit war crimes in Rakhine.149 At the
same time, the IFFM issued stern warnings in its most recent report insisting the
conditions for the remaining Rohingya people in Myanmar were as dire as they
were during the ethnic purges of 2016 and 2017.150 Without further international
assistance and intervention, it is clear the Rohingya minority faces extreme risks
of “killings, rapes and gang rapes, torture, forced displacement and other grave
rights violations” by the Burmese military.151 Based on these conditions alone,
Facebook should be compelled to disclose the requested information due to the
exigent conditions of the ongoing Rohingya crisis.

144
Myanmar’s Government-Commissioned Inquiry Still Cannot Deliver Justice or Accountability, INT’L
COMM’N JURISTS (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.icj.org/myanmars-government-commissioned-inquiry-still-cannotdeliver-justice-or-accountability.
145
Rohingya Crisis: Bangladesh Will No Longer Take in Myanmar Refugees, BBC (Mar. 1, 2019), https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47412704.
146
Id.
147
Textbook Example, supra note 72.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Myanmar’s Rohingya Persecuted, Living Under Threat of Genocide, UN Experts Say, U.N. HUM. RTS.
OFF. HIGH COMM’R (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?
NewsID=24991.
151
What You Need to Know, supra note 73.
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C. Under the Existing Frameworks on Foreign Data Disclosure, the Gambia
Should Succeed in Its Suit Against Facebook
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 Discovery—Assistance to Foreign and International
Tribunals and to Litigants Before Such Tribunals
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, parties to foreign proceedings may obtain relevant
discovery from a person or entity that “resides or is found” in the United States,
as courts “may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a
document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international
tribunal[.]”152 Courts have thus permitted such assistance to foreign proceedings
if the following statutory requirements are met: (1) the person from whom
discovery is sought must “reside” or be “found” in the district; (2) discovery
must be for use in a “proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal”; and (3)
the applicant must be an “interested person[.]”153
If these statutory requirements are met, district courts may authorize
disclosure, but are not required to do so,154 especially when disclosure may
conflict with U.S. law.155 Thus, even when threshold requirements are met,
courts have wide discretion to grant discovery in light of the twin aims of the
statute: (1) providing efficient means of assistance to participants in
international litigation, and (2) encouraging foreign countries by example to
provide similar means of assistance to U.S. courts.156 The U.S. Supreme Court
has found Intel factors relevant when considering whether to exercise its
discretion, but has not mandated lower courts to weigh them or “articulate[d] a
formula for their consideration.”157 The Intel factors are:
(a) whether the “person from whom discovery is sought is a participant in
the foreign proceeding[;]”
(b) “the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings
underway abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign government or the court or
agency abroad to U.S. federal court judicial assistance[;]”
152

28 U.S.C. § 1782.
Id.; Robert W. Gaffey, Developments in U.S. Law Regarding a More Liberal Approach to Discovery
Requests Made by Foreign Litigants Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, JONES DAY (Apr. 2009), https://www.jonesday.
com/en/insights/2009/04/developments-in-us-law-regarding-a-more-liberal-approach-to-discovery-requestsmade-by-foreign-litigants-under-28-usc--1782.
154
Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 255 (2004).
155
Rainsy v. Facebook, 311 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
156
Id. at 252.
157
Hulley Enters. v. Baker Botts LLP, No. 17-1466 (BAH), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142969, at *9 (D.D.C.
Aug. 18, 2017).
153
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(c) whether the request “conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proofgathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country or the United
States[;]” and
(d) whether the request is “unduly intrusive or burdensome[.]”158
2. The Gambia’s Application Should Satisfy the Statutory Requirements of
§ 1782 as the Intel Discretionary Factors Mostly Weigh in Favor of
Disclosure
It is undisputed the Gambia’s application satisfies the statutory requirements
of § 1782: (1) Facebook is found in the District of Columbia and is thus subject
to the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia; (2) the
ICJ proceedings are obviously before an international tribunal; and (3) the
Gambia is an interested party as the litigant in the ICJ proceedings against
Myanmar.159 In addition to facially satisfying the statutory requirements of
§ 1782, the discretionary Intel factors mostly weigh in favor of disclosure:160
First, Facebook is not a participant in the ICJ proceedings between the
Gambia and Myanmar.161 Thus, the need for § 1782 is readily apparent because
the Gambia is unable to obtain the requested information directly through the
international proceeding.162 Second, there is no evidence to suggest the ICJ
would fail to make use of the requested material, thereby allowing the substantial
efforts incurred in producing the material to go to waste.163 In the absence of
evidence that the ICJ would object to the Gambia discovering the information
sought, or that the ICJ objects more generally to the judicial assistance of U.S.
federal courts, the District Court should find that this factor weighs in favor of
disclosure.164 Third, the Gambia’s discovery request to Facebook does not
attempt to circumvent any foreign proof-gathering restrictions. Facebook argues
the Gambia should seek alternative means of requesting subscriber data such as
following the MLAT process.165 However, this is not a viable alternative as the

158

Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 264–65.
Memorandum, supra note 94, at 18–20.
160
Id. at 21.
161
Id. at 22.
162
See In re Varian Med. Sys., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38911, at *8.
163
See id. at *4.
164
Cf. Schmitz v. Bernstein, 376 F.3d 79, 84–85 (2d Cir. 2004) (affirming denial of § 1782 request where
German government expressly objected to the information sought due to concerns it would jeopardize an
ongoing German criminal investigation, as well as German sovereign rights).
165
Respondent's Opposition to Petition's Application at 1, 9, Gambia v. Facebook, Inc., (2020) 1:20-mc00036-JEB-DAR [hereinafter Facebook’s Opposition].
159
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Gambia and United States do not have an existing bilateral agreement, nor can
they afford the time and resources to negotiate and ratify a bilateral agreement
under these exigent circumstances. Lastly, the Gambia insists the information
requested in its application is relevant and narrowly tailored, and thus not unduly
intrusive or burdensome for Facebook to produce.166
Facebook contends the Gambia’s application ultimately fails to satisfy this
last requirement. Specifically, Facebook argues the scope of the requested
content and communications are “overbroad and disproportionate to the
potential relevance and utility of any resulting information.”167 In particular,
Facebooks claims the Gambia’s request for “[a]ll documents and
communications produced, drafted, posted, or published by” pages, groups, and
individual accounts belonging to various military officials and organizations
could result in thousands of accounts and extend back a decade or more.168
To determine whether a discovery request is unduly intrusive or
burdensome, courts have previously referenced Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
26(b)(1) as the applicable standard in evaluating whether the applicant has
satisfied its burden in establishing a “narrowly-tailored request,”169 which is
“‘proportional’ considering ‘the issues at stake in the action . . . the importance
of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.’”170 Here, the Gambia’s
application seeks to obtain “discovery that would assist it in presenting its case
at the ICJ, namely by obtaining additional evidence of the genocidal intent of
Myanmar’s officials and representatives, and the abuses of media platforms by
Myanmar state actors to further their acts of genocide against the Rohingya.”171
As such, the application identifies specific state officials and organizations that
have previously been linked to coordinated attacks.172 Moreover, multiple
investigatory bodies have established that Burmese military officials began to
systematically orchestrate hate speech campaigns to incite violence and
genocidal acts against the Rohingya minority as early as 2011.173 Thus,
Facebook’s contention that the requested content could potentially date back a
166

Memorandum, supra note 94, at 2.
Facebook’s Opposition, supra note 165, at 10.
168
Id. at 3.
169
In re Application of Nokia Corp., 2013 WL 6073457, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2013); In re Cathode
Ray Tube Antitrust Litig., 2013 WL 183944, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2013).
170
MetaLab Design, Ltd. v. Zozi Int’l, Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5448 at *4; In re Hoteles City Express,
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117444 at *3.
171
Facebook’s Opposition, supra note 165, at 24.
172
Id.
173
Human Rights Council, supra note 91, at 14.
167
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decade or more appears to support the Gambia’s claim its application is relevant
to the purpose of its investigation. Lastly, the associated burden and expense
from the proposed discovery of thousands of accounts outweigh the likely
benefit of providing substantive evidence in implicating the identified military
officials and organizations for Gambia’s case against Myanmar.
Alternatively, Facebook asserts the Gambia’s application “raises serious
foreign policy and international comity concerns” that caution against
disclosure.174 In particular, Facebook argues the disclosure of “the personal
communications of senior Myanmar officials and their connections with various
other individuals, entities, or groups, without following established policies for
a foreign government to seek such information from entities like Facebook”
would establish an untenable precedent.175 Interestingly, it cites In re Letters
Rogatory from the Tokyo District Prosecutor’s Office as an example in which
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit quashed a discovery request due
to comity concerns.176 There, the court held that compelling the Tokyo District
Prosecutor’s Office to produce evidence raised significant concerns of
international comity because it would “risk sending a message of disrespect for
Japanese laws and procedures.”177 By analogizing itself to the Tokyo District
Prosecutor’s Office, Facebook attempts to elevate its standing as a private
corporate entity to that of a government law enforcement agency. In some ways,
Facebook wields significant influence over the public and enforces its own code
of conduct online with its Community Standards. However, disregarding foreign
national laws and procedures arguably implicates much higher stakes than
undermining a corporation’s terms of service.
As to foreign affairs and international parity, the court may want to consider
whether quashing a discovery request to further prevent the commission of
genocide would actually diminish international perception of the United States’
commitment to human rights. Currently, the United States holds an unreliable
record on international human rights.178 Despite leading the historic movement
for a universal human rights system in the early twentieth century, creating the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and participating in adjudicating the
174
175
176
177
178

Facebook’s Opposition, supra note 165, at 12.
Id.
Id.
In re Letters Rogatory from the Tokyo Dist. Prosecutor’s Office, 16 F.3d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 1994).
See, e.g., UN Issues Scathing Assessment of US Human Rights Record, ACLU (May 15, 2015), https://

www.aclu.org/blog/human-rights/human-rights-and-criminal-justice/un-issues-scathing-assessment-ushuman-rights (enumerating tangible solutions US could implement in longstanding human rights abuses such
as halting detention of immigrant families and children; addressing police brutality and excessive use of force;
ending racial profiling of minorities and immigrants).
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Nuremburg Trials after World War II, the United States has since failed to
commit to numerous international human rights agreements, including the Rome
Statute of the ICC that oversees trials for individuals accused of genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity.179 In light of its unreliable record of
committing to international treaties upholding human rights protections, the
United States may actually benefit from taking a stauncher stance in upholding
international humanitarian law over its national priorities.
3. The Court Should Rule in Favor of Disclosure Because Disclosure Is
Not Likely to Violate 18 U.S.C. § 2702—Stored Communications Act
Under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, which implicates Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures of digitally
stored information, Congress enacted the Stored Communications Act (SCA).180
Specifically, SCA § 2702 addresses voluntary and compelled disclosure of
“stored wire and electronic communications and transactional records” held by
third-party internet service providers.181 Absent a statutory exception, § 2702
prohibits remote computing service providers from disclosing content and other
communications pursuant to a civil subpoena.182 Courts have established
Facebook falls within the meaning of an electronic communications or remote
computing service provider under the SCA, and therefore is not generally
permitted and cannot be compelled to respond to civil subpoenas that seek
production of records.183 SCA §§ 2702 (b)–(c) provide narrow exemptions under
which a provider may disclose communications, including instances when the
provider believes in good faith an “emergency involving danger of death or
serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure without delay of
communications relating to the emergency.”184 As discussed in Part I, the
situation for the Rohingya people in Myanmar remains exigent despite the ICJ’s
orders to enjoin the Burmese government from conducting further genocidal
acts.185 However, unless Facebook is willing to recognize the current
179
Human Rights & the U.S., ADVOCATES FOR HUM. RTS., https://web.archive.org/web/2020103123
3917/https://www.theadvocatesforhumanrights.org/human_rights_and_the_united_states (last visited Oct. 26,
2020).
180
See Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's Guide to
Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1212 (2004)
181
Id. § 2701.
182
Id. § 2702(a).
183
In re Facebook, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1206 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (quashing subpoena issued pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 because “civil subpoenas may not compel production of records from providers like
Facebook”).
184
18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(8).
185
See generally Domino, supra note 102 (noting lack of permanent, robust civic institutions that can
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circumstances in Myanmar as an “emergency involving danger of death or
serious physical injury,” § 2702 will not allow disclosure under § 1782.186 In its
motion to dismiss the Gambia’s application, Facebook indicated it did not
believe the relevant statute applied “even where those account holders are
foreign governments and high-ranking foreign officials accused of genocide.”187
Thus, without any applicable exception, disclosure pursuant to a § 1782 request
could be deemed inappropriate under § 2702, unless the Gambia can show that
a compelling case of exigency exists and the disclosure of the requested
communications would directly address the imminent risk of death or serious
bodily harm. In light of the current state of emergency imposed on the country
by the Myanmar government and the ensuing violence, the future of the
Rohingya minority is less certain than ever. Disclosure of the requested
information relating to specific military officials and organizations could help
Facebook preemptively take down accounts and prevent concerted efforts to
incite further violence against protestors and minorities alike.
CONCLUSION
In light of these considerable procedural hurdles and delays in ongoing
investigations, international disclosure laws should be amended to address
narrow exceptions involving crimes against humanity and genocide. As the
world has become more interconnected and reliant on communicating through
social media networks,188 evidence of crimes is now more readily available in
seemingly infinite forms of online posts, photos, and videos. At the same time,
foreign investigatory bodies and governments continue to encounter mounting
challenges to accessing these vital sources of information as American tech
companies rely on outdated discovery measures.189 Specifically, the MLAT
process is widely acknowledged as a necessary but cumbersome system that
involves extensive bilateral negotiations and even more lengthy processing
times once parties are able to submit and respond to foreign requests for digitally
stored information.190 In addition to these procedural delays, which can average
two to three years, compliance from the responding party can vary and result in

adequately address civilian concerns and prosecute criminally responsible authorities, as well as ongoing armed
conflict, and COVID outbreak preventing safe return of displaced individuals); What You Need to Know, supra
note 73 (outlining detailed timeline of past and current conditions precipitating and precluding safe voluntary
return to Myanmar).
186
18 U.S.C. § 2702.
187
Facebook’s Opposition, supra note 165, at 6.
188
Klonick, supra note 107, at 2496–97.
189
Hill, supra note 18, at 5.
190
Id.
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only partial disclosure or outright rejection. In particular, requesting parties often
fail to provide the requisite detail and specificity responding parties need to
adequately identify pertinent information.191 In the context of social media cases,
requesting parties may not fully comprehend the technical capabilities and
complexities surrounding data storage and retention. Thus, these requesting
parties fail to adequately specify the different types of information they seek and
simply ask for all available information associated with an individual.
To tackle these procedural obstacles, various foreign countries, including
Brazil and India, have started to launch alternative means that can circumvent
the MLAT process, such as imposing exorbitant taxes on non-compliant tech
companies. On one hand, governments should refrain from resorting to
retaliatory measures that will inevitably threaten existing business relations with
private corporate entities. On the other hand, governments should continue
pursuing less costly and aggressive measures by reforming existing bilateral
agreements to become better suited for the digital age.192 In addition to
increasing MLAT funding to reduce the backlog of legal process served on the
United States from foreign governments,193 MLAT processes should expedite
high-priority cases invoking exigent and sensitive circumstances, such as
national security or genocide. Alternatively, governments could consider
establishing a secondary pipeline for these cases and uniform standards to ensure
requesting parties receive the necessary information, while respecting industrywide interpretations of appropriate data requests.194
In addition to the procedural setbacks the Gambia faced in its discovery case
against Facebook, and to a broader extent Myanmar, the dispute between the
Gambia and Facebook also highlights broader themes that remain on the horizon
for international discovery. Specifically, foreign states and associated
government actors will continue to face considerable hurdles in compelling
American tech companies to disclose content under the existing regulatory
schemes. Unless governments meaningfully coordinate with each other, as well
as with non-governmental organizations such as civic society groups dedicated
to online platform regulation, tech companies will continue to exert enormous
influence and autonomy over their platforms and circumvent regulatory
oversight.195

191
192
193
194
195

Id. at 2.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
See Klonick, supra note 107, at 2446–47.
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Currently, American tech companies operate extensively outside the United
States in regions prone to political instability, authoritarian governance, and
human rights abuse risks. Under their laissez-faire approach to content
moderation, these American companies risk becoming “absentee
landlord[s]”196—detached from the daily realities on the ground and unable to
effectively mobilize in the face of mass crimes of atrocity.197 As seen in the case
of Myanmar, Facebook only began to implement significant changes six years
into the ongoing crisis.198 This was only after the international press,
intergovernmental organizations, human rights advocacy groups, and users
around the world mounted a concerted campaign demanding greater
accountability, transparency, and action following alarming reports of ethnic
violence against the Rohingya Muslims.199 Despite years of tell-tale signs and
explicit warnings of rampant abuses on its platforms, Facebook has continually
failed to address these issues. The international community cannot expect tech
behemoths like Facebook to become more agile and transparent when they only
continue to expand their global influence. Facebook did not respond to the
Rohingya Genocide out of a sense of moral or even legal obligation. Instead, the
company reacted to assuage public outcry and prevent further damage to its
reputation as a democratic, value-driven platform. In essence, Facebook only
wanted to sustain user engagement and ultimately, its bottom-line.200
While corporate entities are entitled and certainly expected to prioritize their
business initiatives, global social media companies like Facebook hold positions
of influence and enjoy relative immunity from government interference.
Therefore, they should be independently checked by more permanent and
sustainable mechanisms rooted within the law. Passively relying on tech
companies to preserve goodwill and act in line with their purported democratic
principles is fundamentally flawed, naïve, and dangerously inefficient.201
Admittedly, Facebook has taken promising steps to develop a more robust
infrastructure of regulating hate speech on its platform starting with the
Facebook Oversight Board, the “Facebook Supreme Court” that will review and
196
Matthew Ingram, In Some Countries, Fake News on Facebook Is a Matter of Life and Death, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV. (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.cjr.org/analysis/facebook-rohingya-myanmar-fake-news.php.
197
See Klonick, supra note 107, at 2448; Douek, supra note 91, at 3.
198
For example, staffing more Burmese language experts on its content-moderation teams or coordinating
more extensively with local non-governmental agencies. See generally Su, supra note 118 (publishing
Facebook’s official findings on how it failed to adequately respond and what changes have been implemented
since 2018).
199
Id. at 3; Stecklow, supra note 120, at 9; Ingram, supra note 196.
200
See Klonick, supra note 107, at 2448.
201
See id.

KIM_4.25.22

198

4/25/2022 5:33 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

issue decisions on the pressing and challenging content-moderation issues.202
Since Mr. Zuckerberg first announced Facebook’s plans to establish the
Oversight Board in the latter half of 2018, the independent board experiment has
remained in the planning stages of constructing bylaws and nominating
appointees with no committed timeline in sight.203 Recognizing that “Facebook
should not make so many important decisions about free expression and safety
on [its] own[]” is a vital first step.204 Unfortunately, this has come at the horrific
expense of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya Muslims.205
As such, other tech companies should consider investing in sustainable,
independent review systems that can act as credible checks and balances against
corporate inertia and decision-making blind spots. In particular, social media
companies that are effectively gatekeepers of free expression, like Twitter and
YouTube,206 should consider the structure of the Facebook Oversight Board.
The Oversight Board is funded through its trust, ensuring financial independence
while the Board strives to be entirely self-governed.207 Whether other social
media companies emulate the Facebook Oversight Board, its pseudoadjudicatory process of reviewing appeals and publishing decisions on takedown
requests, and other content-moderation policies remains up for debate.208
However, appointing constitutional lawyers, policy wonks, and human
rights experts to a board of trustees is not enough and should not act as a panacea
to resist government intervention entirely. The scalability and efficacy of the
Facebook Oversight Board remain untested. One scholar estimates the Board is
unlikely to keep up with the sheer number of high priority cases based on its
202
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current set-up: To review even one percent of appeals, forty board members
would have to review roughly 1700 cases a day with a ninety day turnaround
time.209 Even if the Oversight Board manages to issue judgment-like decisions
on how Facebook should proceed with sensitive content appeals, whether these
decisions establish industry standards remains uncertain. Instead, as more
companies adopt self-regulatory advisory councils and review boards,
inconsistent practices across different platforms may arise.210 In light of these
nascent developments, courts are unlikely to reference these decisions as
anything more than persuasive if and when disputes over international data
disclosure continue to increase in the near future.211 Thus, with this current gap
in establishing a sustainable infrastructure of self-regulation and content
reporting among American tech companies, governments are at a critical
juncture to reform existing evidence-gathering procedures. For now, the
international community should take note of the United States District Court’s
decision mandating Facebook disclose deleted content requested by the Gambia
as a promising next step. With the Myanmar military back in power, Facebook
must act before it is too late.
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